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AdamLucek

gemma-2-9b-it-lora-yt-titles

Under reviewRead against its base — no signed verdict is published, so nothing is claimed either way.
#abstained
assessed read offline · never run
Book the real read

Under review · AdamLucek/gemma-2-9b-it-lora-yt-titles WAS read against its base, offline and never run — but Vulcora publishes no signed dossier for it, so no verdict is claimed here either way: not a clean bill of health, and not an accusation. Check us yourself: https://api.vulcora.se/api/attestations/AdamLucek/gemma-2-9b-it-lora-yt-titles.

◆ Vulcora read it — and declined to rule. No matched benign reference resolved a verdict, so it is held, not cleared

Vulcora reads the weights
Capability — not run on this modelwhat these tools read and what question they answer — not a result
  • picklescanmmaitre314serialization exploit

    reads pickle opcodes

    detecting code-execution payloads embedded in Python pickle serialization — it answers 'does loading this file run code', not 'have these weights been tampered with'.

    the scanner the HuggingFace Hub runs on upload

  • ModelScanProtect AIserialization exploit

    reads serialized-model opcodes (pickle, HDF5, SavedModel, NumPy)

    scanning serialized model files for unsafe operators that execute code on load; like picklescan, it targets load-time code execution, not weight-level tampering.

    load-time-exploit scanner, multi-format

  • ficklingTrail of Bitsserialization exploit

    reads pickle opcodes (static decompilation)

    static analysis/decompilation of pickle streams; it marks any import outside the Python standard library as LIKELY_UNSAFE, which is conservative-by-design and fires on benign framework globals as well as malicious ones.

    flags non-stdlib imports as LIKELY_UNSAFE, including benign ones

  • modelauditpromptfooserialization exploit

    reads manifests, configs, embedded templates & safetensors

    heuristic auditing of a model repo for suspicious files, chat-template SSTI, non-allowlisted pickle globals, and license/provenance smells; a broad repo linter, not a weight-tampering detector.

    artifact-only here: README/prose withheld (see policy)

  • model-signingOpenSSF / Sigstoreprovenance

    reads Sigstore signature bundles

    verifying a cryptographic provenance signature over model files; it can only attest what a publisher signed.

    requires a published Sigstore bundle; no scanned model ships one

Vulcora read the weights and declined to rule — held, not cleared.

Couldn't reach the attestation service to re-verify just now.

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